Aristotle as well as Nietzsche. Solomon thinks Nietzsche wants to return to the values of masterly virtue. 2 The Übermensch is Aristotle's megalopsychos-the great-souled man. 3 Good and Evil, he even suggests that "it might be a basic characteristic of existence that those who would know it completely would perish…" 10 And it was not just intellectual reflection that led Nietzsche to a belief in the horror of existence. He lived it himself. 11 In a letter of April 10, 1888, he writes:
Around 1876 my health grew worse….There were extremely painful and obstinate headaches which exhausted all my strength. They increased over long years, to reach a climax at which pain was habitual, so that any given year contained for me two hundred days of pain….My specialty was to endure the extremity of pain…with complete lucidity for two or three days in succession, with continuous vomiting of mucus.
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It is also Nietzsche's view that if we look deeply into the essence of things, into the horror of existence, we will be overwhelmed-paralyzed. Like Hamlet we will not be able to act, because we see that action cannot change the eternal nature of things. 13 We must realize, Nietzsche says, that "a profound illusion…first saw the light of the world in the person of Socrates: the unshakeable faith that thought…can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it. This sublime metaphysical illusion accompanies science as an instinct…" 14 In Nietzsche's view, we cannot change things. Instead, with Hamlet we should "feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that [we] should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint." 15 Knowledge of the horror of existence kills action. Action requires distance and illusion.
The horror and meaninglessness of existence must be veiled if we are to live and act. What we must do, Nietzsche thinks, is construct a meaning for suffering. Suffering we can handle.
Meaningless suffering, suffering for no reason at all, we cannot handle. So we give it a meaning. We invent a meaning. We create an illusion. The Greeks constructed gods for whom wars and other forms of suffering were festival plays and thus an occasion to be celebrated by the poets. Christians imagine a God for whom suffering is punishment for sin. 16 Even if we were to reject Nietzsche's view, even if we refuse to accept the notion that it is impossible to significantly reduce suffering, the whole question may well become moot.
Nietzsche tells a story:
Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of "world history," but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die.
17
Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering, whatever change we think we are bringing about, it may all amount to nothing more than a brief and accidental moment in biological time, whose imminent disappearance will finally confirm the horror and meaninglessness of existence.
I do not think we can dismiss Nietzsche's view simply because it goes counter to mainstream assumptions. And we certainly cannot dismiss it if we hope to understand Nietzsche.
III
Let us try to draw out the philosophical implications that follow from the horror of existence. If existence really is horrible, if to know it completely, as Nietzsche suggests in Beyond Good and Evil, means we are likely to perish, 18 then knowledge of the truth cannot be good for us. The horror of existence, if we think through its consequences, will put us radically at odds with perhaps the most fundamental assumption of philosophy since Plato and Aristotle, namely, that the true and the good coincide. Philosophers assume that the truth-far from being harmful-will be good for us. And what is really good for us will necessarily be something that is not an illusion or a lie but the truth. As Nietzsche puts it:
"All supreme values are of the first rank, all the supreme concepts…the good, the true….neither can these supreme concepts be incommensurate with one another, be would see that the idea of the good is not only compatible with, but is the very source of, the true. 25 The last thing we would want would be to return to the bottom of the cave.
Contemplating the true and the good, for Plato, would be the highest happiness. 26 Here, the truth is not horror and terror.
So also, the view of modern science is that human rationality can discover the truth, that this is good for human beings, and that it will lead to overall progress for humanity, that is, to increasing happiness.
Nietzsche rejects all of this: "For a philosopher to say, 'the good and the beautiful are one,' is infamy; if he goes on to add, 'also the true,' one ought to thrash him. Truth is ugly.…
We possess art lest we perish of the truth." 27 He also says, "There is no preestablished harmony between the furthering of truth and the well-being," that is, the good, "of humanity." 28 There is nothing Nietzsche would reject more, we might say, than Plato's allegory of the cave. 29 We cannot climb up out of the cave and look directly at the truth. It would probably kill us. There is a reason why we are down in the cave with our backs to the truth. It is true that the shadows at the bottom of the cave are illusions, distortions, lies. But it is not true that the shadows lock us into a prison. They keep out the horror. They preserve life. Life exists, only exists, at the bottom of the cave.
The truth is not good for human beings-the truth is horror. Reality as it truly is, is not beautiful-it is terrifying. To pursue the truth, far from pursuing the good and achieving One might try to respond that while it is obviously the case that some things are not good for us, nevertheless, knowing the truth is always good for us. It is certainly best for us to know what is bad, dangerous, threatening, and so forth. It might help us to avoid such things.
But if existence is truly alien, if to come to know the truth means we are likely to perish, if it is at odds with human life, if existence is ontologically horrible (not just occasionally irritating), then Jocasta is right, knowing the truth is not good for us. 31 That is the subversive proposition Nietzsche wants to force us to think about.
IV
Nietzsche embraces the doctrine of eternal recurrence for the first time in The Gay Science:
The greatest weight.-What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: "This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence-even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!"
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: "You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine." If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal? 32 It is not enough that eternal recurrence simply be believed. Nietzsche demands that it actually be loved. In Ecce Homo, he explains his doctrine of amor fati: "My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it…but love it." 33 In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche says: "To redeem those who lived in the past and to recreate all 'it was' into a 'thus I willed it'-that alone should I call redemption." 34 To turn all "it was" into a "thus I willed it" is to accept fate fully, to love it. One would have it no other way; one wants everything eternally the same, "'Was that life?….Well then! Once
How are we to understand these doctrines? The first thing we must do is notice that the philosopher who introduces eternal recurrence and amor fati is the very same philosopher who also believes in the horror and terror of existence-a point that is never emphasized by At the beginning of the essay, "Concerning the Sublime," Schiller wrote:
nothing is so beneath the dignity of a human being as to suffer violence….whoever cowardly suffers it, tosses his humanity aside….Every human being finds himself in this position. He is surrounded by countless forces, all superior to him and all playing the master over him.…If he can no longer oppose physical forces with a corresponding physical force, then nothing else remains for him to do to avoid suffering violence than to do completely away with a relation so deleterious to him and to destroy conceptually a brute force that he in fact must endure. However, to destroy a force conceptually means nothing other than to submit to it voluntarily. had over him. He ended his subjugation. He put himself in charge. He turned all "it was" into a "thus I willed it." Everything that was going to happen in his life, he accepted, he chose, he willed. He became sovereign over his life. There was no way to overcome his illness except by embracing it.
V
Let us now turn our attention to virtue. While it can easily be shown that Nietzsche believes in virtue, I do not think he believes in ordinary virtue. He says: "One should defend virtue against the preachers of virtue: they are its worst enemies. For they teach virtue as an ideal for everyone; they take from virtue the charm of rareness, inimitableness, exceptionalness and unaverageness-its aristocratic magic." 41 In Beyond
Good and Evil, he also says: "It is probable that we, too, still have our virtues, although in all fairness they will not be the simpleminded and foursquare virtues for which we hold our grandfathers in honor-and at arms length." 42 Nietzsche thinks that "each one of us should devise his own virtue…"
43
He says that he is "actually the very opposite of the type of man who so far has been revered as virtuous." 44 In fact, he thinks that any virtue "becomes a virtue through rising against that blind power of the factual and tyranny of the actual.…It always swims against the tide of history…" 45 This suggests that a figure like King Vishvamitra, who
Nietzsche describes in the Genealogy of Morals, could be a model for the development of virtue:
As men of frightful ages, they did this by using frightful means: cruelty toward themselves, inventive self-castigation-this was the principal means these powerhungry hermits and innovators of ideas required to overcome the gods and tradition in themselves, so as to be able to believe in their own innovations. I recall the famous story of King Vishvamitra, who through millennia of selftorture acquired such a feeling of power and self-confidence that he endeavored to build a new heaven-the uncanny symbol of the most ancient and most recent experience of philosophers on earth: whoever has at some time built a "new heaven" has found the power to do so only in his own hell. 46 To overthrow the tyranny of the actual, to overcome the gods and tradition, one must develop new powers, new self-confidence, new capacities, new virtues. We must:
confront our inherited and hereditary nature with our knowledge, and through a new, stern discipline combat our inborn heritage and implant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that our first nature withers away. It is an attempt to give oneself, as it were a posteriori, a past in which one would like to originate in opposition to that in which one did originate… "what is good and evil no one knows yet, unless it be he who creates. He, however, creates man's goal and gives the earth its meaning and its future. That anything at all is good and evil-that is his creation." 48 Only when a Vishvamitra has created a new heaven, that is, a new meaning structure, a new moral paradigm, will we be able to tell what is good and evil and develop new virtues accordingly. Aristotelian virtue is completely at odds with Nietzsche's vision of the horror of existence and the need to conceal it. If we ask the simplest of questions, if we ask how we should value the traditional virtue of truthfulness, we quickly see that Nietzsche and
Aristotle would be deeply opposed. For Nietzsche, we cannot give anything like the traditional answer, the answer Aristotle's would certainly give. For Nietzsche, we need illusion, we need art, we need lies. 49 We must conceal the truth-the horror of existence.
The Übermensch must build up the power to create a grand illusion. 50 We do not, for
Nietzsche, live in a world where the good and the true will agree. The truth is that reality is It is true that Nietzsche seeks the sorts of virtues that would empower the great man or the Übermensch and allow him to flourish. But this is a radically different kind of flourishing than Aristotle had in mind. As MacIntyre puts it, for Aristotle, virtues enable us to realize our true nature and reach our true end. 56 In realizing our nature, in becoming what we should become, in realizing our true end, we will achieve our good, that is, we will flourish and be happy. This implies and requires a fit between the human essence and the world. It is as if they were designed for each other-certainly they cannot be alien and opposed to each other. For Nietzsche, this is ridiculous. To realize our nature as Aristotle understands nature, to achieve our good as Aristotle understands good, that is, a good that accords with the true, far from allowing us to flourish, far from making us happy, would plunge us into the horror and terror of existence. We live in an alien and hostile cosmos and we need lies to conceal this fact from ourselves.
Moreover, we need the power to create and maintain these illusions. Such powers are virtues. They build a certain kind of character. They build a disposition. They enable one to function in a certain way. To this extent we have a virtue ethic. But it does not realize our essence. If, for Nietzsche, we can even be said to have an essence, it would be some sort of Dionysian chaos, and the task of any virtue would be to conceal it, not realize it. 57 As far as our true end goes, if we can in any way be said to have one, it would be horror and terror, something we do not want to realize, something we want to conceal.
If we can look back over our entire life and say it was a good one, then, for Aristotle, it was a happy life. If in looking back over our entire life, we must instead admit that it was a life of horrible and meaningless suffering, then, for Aristotle, it would be impossible to say it was a happy life. 58 If it is necessary to lie, to live in illusion, in order to conceal this meaningless suffering, then, for Aristotle, it would be impossible to say it was a good life.
What if, however, one was able to look back over such a life and was able to love it? They may begin to dominate you. You will begin to wish you did not have to suffer through so many of them, you will try to develop strategies for coping with them, you will worry about them, and pretty soon you may again be enslaved by them. Your attitude toward any moment cannot be a desire to avoid it, change it, reduce it-or it may begin to dominate you. 65 Such love, Aristotle would consider abject and degrading.
Aristotle would completely reject the Übermensch.
On the other hand, though, if in looking back over your life, for Aristotle, you were to find it a good one, a happy one, even the best life, there would be nothing about it that would necessarily make you want to live it again. And if one day you were informed by the demon that you had to live it again over and over an infinite number of times, even
Aristotle, as this idea gained possession of him, might "throw [him]self down and gnash
[his] teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus…" 
